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ABSTRACT 
 
The article objective is to describe a longitudinal analysis of the Indonesian Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSC). Article presents the history of petroleum contractual agreements in 
Indonesia, selected indicators to evaluate PSCs performance, the statistical techniques used to 
analyze the data, statistical results, operational indicators, discussion of results and linkage to 
concept of accountability. The conclusion is the longitudinal study on the PSCs performance over 
the last 30 years have indicated that the current structure of the agreements seemed to have failed 
in supporting the dynamic contractual accountability between the host country and the FOCs. The 
PSCs lacked the capability to promote both host country and FOCs’ interests in a fair and 
reasonable way. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Penulisan artikel bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan analisis longitudinal Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSC). Dalam artikel ini dibahas sejarah perjanjian kontrak minyak di 
Indonesia,  indikator terpilih untuk mengevaluasi Production Sharing Contracts (PSC), teknik 
statistik yang digunakan untuk menganalisis data, hasil statistik, indikator operasional, diskusi 
hasil dan kaitan konsep akuntabilitas. Simpulannya, studi longitudinal tentang Production Sharing 
Contracts (PSC) lebih dari 30 tahun telah mengindikasikan bahwa struktur perjanjiannya telah 
gagal dalam mendukung kontrak akuntabilitas dinamis antara negara tuan rumah dan 
kepentingan FOCs’ yang adil dan masuk akal. 
 
Kata kunci: Production Sharing Contracts (PSC), akuntabilitas kontraktual 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This article analyzes the performance of the Indonesian PSCs since their inception in 
1967 in order to shed some light on (1) how well-fitted the Indonesian PSCs, in their current 
structure and substance, have been in supporting the dynamic contractual accountability between 
the host country and the FOCs for the last 30 years in order to promote each party’s interests in a 
fair and reasonable way; (2) the role of the Indonesian PSCs in developing the up-stream activities 
in Indonesia over the last 30 years; (3) how changes in the terms and conditions of the Indonesian 
PSCs have led to changes in the up-stream sector’s performance; and (4) whether the changes in 
PSCs terms and conditions have done more good than harm for developing an accountable and 
transparent  government-led management of the Indonesian petroleum industry. 
 
The History of Petroleum Contractual Agreements in Indonesia 
 
Rochmat (1981) revealed that the historical development of contractual arrangements in 
the oil and gas sector in Indonesia can be divided into three eras: the era of concessionary contract, 
that of contract of work, and that of production sharing contracts.  
 
I. Concessionary Contracts  
 
Johnston (1994) argued that: “Concessionary systems, as the term implies, allow private 
ownership of mineral resources”. Under these systems the government transfers the title of the 
minerals to a company if they are produced. The company is then subject to payment of royalties 
and taxes. 
 
Prior to 1960, exploration and exploitation in the field of mining including oil and gas in 
Indonesia were governed by the rules of law as stipulated in the Indies Mining Law of 1899. 
Under this Law of 1899, petroleum exploration was based on concessions in which the colonial 
government granted petroleum ownership rights to foreign companies in return for (surface) tax 
and royalty. The concession, in effect, surrenders part of a nation’s sovereignty to concessionaire 
(Machmud, 2000). Under this agreement, the government did not interfere with the domestic 
affairs of the concessionaire and acted merely as a tax collector.  
 
II. Contract of Work (CoW) 
 
The main characteristics of these Contracts of Works included as follows. 
(1) A requirement for minimum exploration commitment. 
(2) A mandatory relinquishment of 25 per cent of the area after five years of exploration and 
another 25 per cent after 10 years. 
(3) The requirement that the title of oil passed to the foreign company at the point of sale. 
(4) A 60 per cent/40 per cent profit split in favour of Indonesian government after cost recovery. 
(5) A signature and production bonus of $5million, respectively, for new areas. 
(6) The foreign oil companies were to act as the exclusive sales agent to market the oil but the 
National Oil Company reserved the right to elect to take 20 per cent of the aggregate 
production in kind. 
(7) The title to equipment was to belong to the foreign company until fully depreciated. 
Journal The WINNERS, Vol. 4 No. 2, September 2003: 94-111 96
(8) The foreign companies agreed to supply the Indonesian domestic market with crude oil and 
refined products at cost plus fixed fee. 
(9) The status of the foreign oil company was as Contractor to the National Oil Company (NOC), 
but the foreign company still retained the management control of the petroleum operation. 
 
The CoW is based on the principle that sovereignty over natural resources is vested in the 
state until the point of sale. This type of agreement also obliged the companies to relinquish their 
existing concessions to the government and turned them into contractors for the state companies.  
 
III. Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) 
 
The production-sharing agreement was devised by Dr. Ibnu Sutowo (Rochmat, 1981; 
Bee,1982; Johnston, 1994). There are several differences between the CoW and PSC. If the CoW 
was signed by the government, the PSCs were signed by the National Oil Company. PSCs are not 
subject to ratification by the parliament but must be approved by the president of Indonesia. The 
National Oil Company, is therefore, active in all fields and phases of the operations. 
 
IV. Characteristics of PSCs 
 
Indonesia is believed to be the first country to apply production sharing to petroleum 
operations (Barrow, 1993). The first production sharing agreement was signed in 1966 with 
International Indonesian American Petroleum Company (IIAPCO) a small independent company 
compared to the big former concession holders in Indonesia. The basic structure of the Indonesian 
PSCs reflects the following features. 
 
(1) Management is vested in the National Oil Company, Pertamina. Contractors, mainly foreign 
oil companies, are the operators who are responsible to Pertamina for operations in 
accordance with agreed Work Programs and Budget. 
(2) The contractor provides all financial and technical assistance for petroleum operations, and 
carries the risk of operating costs.  
(3) The Contractor prepares a work program and budget of operating costs annually to be agreed 
with Pertamina. 
(4) All equipment purchased by the contractor becomes the property of Pertamina when landed 
in Indonesia, although leased equipment is exempt. 
(5) Pertamina has the title to all data obtained from the operations. 
(6) The contractor pays Indonesian taxes on income. Pertamina reimburses the contractor for 
other taxes paid in conducting operations. 
(7) The contractor is to supply Indonesia’s domestic requirement for crude oil, called the 
Domestic Market Obligation (DMO). 
 
V. PSCs Generations 
 
Barrow (1993) argued that Indonesian PSCs have evolved over three generations; PSCs 
generation-1 lasted for 10 years from 1966 to 1976, PSCs generation-2 lasted for 11 years up to 
1987, while those of generation-3 lasted from 1988 to 1999. 
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1. First Generation 1966 to 1976 
 
The first generation PSC was introduced in 1966. The principal features of the 1966 to 
1976 PSCs include bellows. 
 
a. Pertamina had the final management by approving Work Program,Budget and Plan of 
Development. 
b. All equipment bought by the contractor and imported into Indonesia automatically 
became the property of Pertamina. However, the contractor had the first right of use of 
assets as long as they were required for operations. 
c. Contractors having more than one working area in Indonesia could not consolidate 
financial results for calculating their obligation to the Government. This ring fence has 
continued in subsequent generations of the  PSCs. 
d. Under the simple first generation of PSCs, cost recovery was limited to 40% of 
production. The remaining 60% of production were shared between the Government 
(65%) and the contractor (35%). The 35% was a clean share, or an after-tax income for 
the contractor, as the National Oil Company assumed the tax obligation. However, above 
the production level of 75, 000 barrel of oil per day (BOPD), the formula became 
67.5%/32.5% in favour of the Government.  
e. Contractors were obliged to deliver oil to the domestic market up to a maximum of 25% 
of their 35% share of total production, for which they received a fee of $0.20 per barrel. 
 
The PSC was amended in early 1974 owing to the rapid oil price increase in 1973. The 
balance between the actual price and the base price, multiplied by the contractor’s equity share, 
was split 85 to 15 in favour of the Government. In 1975 a US tax ruling disallowed tax credits for 
corporate taxes paid in Indonesia by the contractors under PSCs. Consequently, negotiations to 
amend the PSCs took place in 1976, and the second generation was introduced. 
 
2. Second Generation: 1976 to 1988 
 
Under the second generation, PSCs the basic principles remained the same but cost was 
now calculated on the accepted accounting principles without a 40% ceiling. In other words, there 
was a 100% cost recovery. The remaining revenue was split 85 to 15 in favour of the Government.  
The idea of depreciation and amortization was introduced in determining total cost recoveries. 
Under the new scheme, cost recovery consists of all current year non-capital cost, the amortization 
of carried-forward non-capital costs (The carried-forward non-capital costs include pre-1976 
Contractors’ un-recovered expenditure carried forward to subsequent years) and the depreciation 
of capital costs. The capital costs were depreciated using DDB (double declining balance) at 
different percentages depending on the capital asset groupings/classifications, while the carried-
forward non-capital costs were depreciated using SLD (Straight Line Declining) over the 
remaining useful life. 
 
Determining cost recovery based on accepted accounting principles without ceiling 
created complications when oil prices started to fall in the early 1980’s; a new field, with high 
costs and a small reserve, might not provide income to the Government during the entire lifetime. 
Therefore, to protect the Government’s income, the National Oil Company created a new rule, the 
‘Declaration of Commerciality’, in which a new field could only be declared ‘commercial’ for 
development if there was at least 49% of the cash flow for the Government. Contractors were 
generally unhappy with this requirement due to the fact that such declaration was unilaterally 
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determined under the authority of Pertamina. If Pertamina declared that a field was not 
commercial, it meant Contractors could not recover all their operating expenditures. This new rule 
contained many loopholes for collusion and corruption that added more inefficiencies to the 
industry (Oon, 1986; Barnes, 1995). Due to these weaknesses, the third generation of PSCs was 
introduced to help solving them. 
 
2. Third Generation: 1988 to 1999 
 
In 1988, the Government issued some incentives to enhance oil exploration activities, 
creating the ‘third generation’ PSCs. There were some basic changes to this generation compared 
to the previous generation. For special conditions such as for pre-tertiary layers in frontier areas, 
the 85% minimum Government Take was reduced to 75%. The take for small fields in 
conventional areas was reduced to 80% and to 75% in frontier areas. 
 
The DMO fee, which had been $0.20 per barrel in previous generations, was increased to 
10% of export price, and in 1992 it was increased again to 15% of export price. However, for the 
first five years full export price was given. At the same time, based on the 1984 tax law, 
Contractor’s tax rate was reduced from 56 to 48 per cent thereby resulting in a reduction of the 
‘gross up’ in kind received by the Contractors (from 34.09 to 28.85 per cent). 
 
During this generation, as a ‘floor’ for Government revenue and to eliminate the 
‘commerciality’ issue, the ‘First Tranche Petroleum’ (FTP) concept was introduced in 1988. Under 
this concept, the first 20 per cent of production was subject to production sharing before cost 
recovery. This 20 per cent FTP was split between the Government and the Contractor, based on 
the prevailing PSC arrangement.  
 
In 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1994, the Government issued a series of exploration 
incentives packages designed to encourage new exploration in high-risk areas - especially in the 
eastern part of Indonesia. The Government issued improved contract terms, first on 31 August 
1988, then on 22 February 1989 and later on 31 August 1992. For example, in the 1988 package 
the investment credit became 110% for oil and 55% for gas for new PSCs, both standard and 
frontier/deepwater, while in the 1989 package, crude production from pre-tertiary reservoir rock 
was divided on the basis of incremental sliding scale (Crude productions up to 50,000 b/d are 
divided 80/20, from 50,000 – 150,000 b/d using 85/15 and over 150,000 b/d using 90/10 in favour 
of government).  
 
The 1992 incentives contained improvements to existing contract terms which were 
designed to increase exploration activities particularly in high-risk frontier areas. For example, 
there was a 125% incentive credit for exploration in water depth in excess of 1,500 meters. The 
1993/1994 incentive packages were aimed at stimulating exploration in the eastern part of 
Indonesia. For example, the FTP was reduced from 20% to 15%.  
   
VI. The New Oil and Gas Law 
 
In November 2001, the Indonesian parliament finally passed a new oil and gas law to 
replace the two previous laws (Law No.44/1960 and No.8/1971) despite a chorus of criticism 
against it from a number of special interest groups such as NOC, local authorities and 
environmental groups (Jakarta Post, 2001). The new law is aimed at liberalizing the oil and gas 
sector by scrapping a 30-year monopoly held by the National Oil Company, Pertamina.  
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The bill promises a fundamental change in the governance of Indonesian’s petroleum 
industry by establishing two new government agencies: implementing and regulatory body. The 
implementing body is assigned to regulate up-stream sector and take over Pertamina’s role in 
dealing with foreign oil companies, while the independent regulatory body will manage domestic 
fuel supplies and distribution. The law states that Pertamina must become a limited liability 
company within two years, thus forcing it to compete with domestic and international companies.  
Under the new law, the investor may enter a cooperation contract, not necessarily limited to a 
production sharing agreement, as long as such a contract is beneficial for the country.   
 
Selected Indicators to evaluate PSCs Performance 
 
Two indicators were selected in order to evaluate the degree of up-stream activities and 
performance under the Indonesian PSCs: financial and operational indicators. Financial indicators 
include government share (both in relative and absolute terms), contractor share (both in relative 
and absolute terms), cost recoveries, contractors’ profits and total exploration expenditure. 
Operational indicators include seismic activities, exploratory wells completed, total proven and 
probable reserve, total crude production and the total PSCs approved and signed by the 
government.  
 
I. Financial Indicators 
 
In this study, financial indicators include government share and contractor share which 
consists of contractor profit and cost recoveries as defined in the literature (Johnston 1994;Barrow, 
1993; Bindemann, 1999). Government share, used interchangeably with government take, includes 
all revenues for the government under the PSCs such as royalties, bonuses, FTP, tax, profit oil or 
revenue, but excludes DMO. Cost recoveries consist of all non-capital expenditure and a portion of 
capital expenditure claimed by Contractors under the accounting rules and procedures stipulated in 
Exhibit C of the PSCs, while contractor profit means net of tax profit oil distributed to the 
contractor. Government share proportion, which is the proportion the government share to the sum 
of government share, and contractor share was also used in the analysis. In this case, government 
share proportion is 100% minus contractor share proportion.  
 
These variables were used as dependent variables in order to see if there was a significant 
relationship between them and independent variables such as “the generation” of the PSCs, the 
region where the operators are doing their exploration, the working area (onshore or offshore), the 
international oil price, the size and owner of the operators to see if  there is (are) significant 
relationship(s) between them (Size category uses the level of exploration, development, and 
production expenditure, while ownership refers to the majority interest held by shareholders in  the 
home country). In addition, the possibility of that changes in the PSCs terms and conditions have 
influenced the level of government share and contractor share was also investigated. For the 
purposes of this analysis, financial data were provided by the Bureau of Finance and Economic of 
Pertamina MPS. These data regarding the financial performance of each of the producing 
Contractors covered a period 1967 to 1999. One potential weakness of this study is that these data 
were supplied by an official source rather than an independent one and as such, the validity and 
reliability of the data could be called into question. However, this is the only source of data 
available for the researcher or for other institutions interested in conducting research on the 
Indonesian PSCs.  
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II. Operational Indicators 
 
To investigate how changes in the PSCs terms and conditions have influenced the 
Indonesian up-stream activities, some operational indicators were selected. They include the length 
of seismic achievements, exploration wells completed, total reserves secured, total crude 
production and total units of PSCs signed by the government. As pointed out by Mahmud (1997), 
these operational indicators are believed to be closely related. For example, increased seismic 
activities permit the identification of more potential structures, which involves more exploration 
activities in order to discover deposits. This, in turn, is reflected by more exploration wells 
completed. In other words, one could fairly expect more petroleum reserves as a result of  more 
exploration activities. In addition, production is also expected to increase if more reserves are 
found. Finally, total PSCs approved and signed by the Indonesian government could arguably be 
used to assess the attractiveness of the up-stream sector.  
 
As with the financial indicators, data related to these operational indicators were also 
provided by the Bureau of Finance and Economic of Pertamina MPS. Unfortunately, the data 
available for analyzing the operational performance consisted of total annual data for all producing 
Contractors, which covered a period from 1967 to 1999.  Therefore, the analysis was based on the 
aggregate data number for all Contractors rather than on  individual data for a specific year. This 
could be another weakness of this study in addition to the fact that all data come from official 
resources rather than independent  source.  
 
The Statistical Techniques Used to Analyze the Data 
 
I. General Linear Model (GLM)  
 
GLM is generally used to identify how some independent variables may have 
significantly influenced other dependent variables using a certain confidence level. In this study, a 
GLM was estimated to see if independent variables such as (1) generation of the PSCs; (2)regions; 
(3)working areas; (4) international oil price; (5) size of the companies and (6) ownership of the 
companies had a significant influence on government share, contractor profits and cost recoveries. 
  
II. One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the terms and conditions of the Indonesian PSCs 
have evolved over three generations: Generation 1 (1966-1977), Generation 2 (1978-1987) and 
Generation 3 (1988 – 1999). These changes were believed to have come about as the result of both 
national and international influences (Barrow, 1993; Mahmud, 1997; Bindemann, 1999). One-way 
ANOVA was used to make inferences about the means of selected indicators of the PSCs at a 5% 
level of significance. The test was intended to assess whether the means of each selected indicator 
for the three generations were equal. This test will hopefully shed some light on the effects of the 
changes in the PSC terms to the up-stream sector performance (Kruskal Wallis one-way ANOVA 
test was used as an alternative to simple factorial experiment). 
 
III. Multiple Comparison Tests 
 
Multiple comparison tests (Scheffe method) with significance at 5% level were used to identify 
and analyze statistically significant relations among period means for each selected indicators and 
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selected periods (The Scheffe method was used because it is the most conservative one (Ryan and 
Joiner, 1994). 
 
Statistical Results: Financial Indicators 
 
Government Share  
 
Table 1 reveals the results from a GLM, which was estimated to investigate whether 
certain factors have influenced the government share over the last 30 years. Regions where 
explorations have taken place, working areas (onshore versus offshore), international oil price, size 
of the companies, and ownership of the oil companies appear to significantly influence the total 
government share, as indicated by p-values of less than 0.05. Quite surprisingly, however, the 
different PSCs generations do not seem to have significantly influenced the total government 
share, as indicated by a p-value larger than 0.05 (However, using one-way ANOVA, however, 
PSCs generation appear  to have a significant influence on the level of government share, as 
indicated by a p-value of less than 0.05). In other words, changes in PSC terms, if combined with 
other independent factors do not seem to have significantly affected the government share. The R-
squared of 0.491 disclosed in the table means that all six independent variables can explain 49.1% 
of the variability in the government share. This result is a good indication of a strong relationship 
according to Ryan and Joiner (1994). 
 
 
Table 1 GLM ANOVA for Government Share 
 
Analysis of Variance for Government Share, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P 
Region 9 11.36487    3.33312    0.37035    13.03   0.000 
Generation 2 1.70380    0.12627    0.06313    2.22   0.109 
Wrk.Areas 1 0.20883    0.11817    0.11817    4.16   0.042 
Size 2 1.06029    1.24610    0.62305    21.91   0.000 
Oilprice 1 0.65020    0.66900    0.66900    23.53   0.000 
Ownership 4 3.33518    3.33518    0.83380    29.33   0.000 
R-squared = .491 (Adjusted R Squared = .474) 
 
 
Table 2 presents both the government share and contractor share during the three 
generations of PSCs. 
 
 
Table 2 Means for Government and Contractor Share  
 
Generation Government Share 
(%) 
Rank  Contractor 
 Share (%) 
Rank 
1 0.4486 2 0.5514 2 
2 0.5749 1 0.4251 3 
3 0.4240 3 0.576 1 
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From the table it can be seen that there was an increase in the government share in PSCs 
generation 1 from 44,9 per cent to 57.5 per cent in PSC generation 2. However, in PSCs 
generation 3 government share decreased to 42.4 per cent. The main message here is that changes 
in PSCs over three generations have had a tendency to benefit more the Contractors than the host 
government. This phenomenon can be clearly seen in from Figure 1 which shows that the 
government share, particularly since 1981, has  tended to decrease, despite the high international 
price, while the contractor share has tended to increase.  
 
As far as the oil producing regions are concerned, Table 3 reveals that, over the last 30 
years, the Contractors operating in Central Sumatera are those that have contributed the highest 
revenue proportion for the government (64.72%), followed by those in Irian Jaya (54.98%), 
Western Java (51.68%), and Eastern Kalimantan (51.12%).  
 
 
Table 3 Government Share by Regions 
 
Regions Governmet 
share (%) 
Rank Government share (in 
US$ 000) 
Rank 
Central Sumatera (Riau) 0.647 1           772,767.00 1 
Eastern Java 0.093 9             14,982.00 7 
Eastern Kalimantan 0.511 4           298,103.00 4 
Irian Jaya 0.550 2           125,574.00 5 
Jambi 0.097 8               5,656.00 8 
Maluku 0.188 7               1,441.00 9 
Northern Sumatera (Aceh) 0.437 5           478,220.00 3 
Southern Sulawesi  0.409 6                  372.00 10 
Southern Sumatera 0.035 10           117,289.00 6 
Western Java 0.517 3           500,714.00 2 
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Working areas of the FOCs appear to have significantly influenced the amount of oil 
revenue contributed to the government, as indicated by a p-value of 0.043 at a 5% confidence 
level. Table 4 presents the proportion of total revenue transferred to the government based on the 
working area of the Contractors. 
 
 
Table 4 Government Share by Working Areas 
 
Working Area Government Share 
(%) 
Rank Government Share  
(in US$ 000) 
Rank 
Onshore areas 0.467 2 349,307 1 
Offshore areas 0.488 1 333,648 2 
 
 
Contractors operating in offshore areas seem to have contributed more revenues to the 
government than those in onshore areas over the last 30 years (48.8% versus 46.7%).  In PSCs 
generation 1, companies operating onshore have contributed US$ 191,331,000 on average to the 
government; this is more than 200 times greater than that contributed by those operating offshore, 
with a mean US$ 93,057,000. However, in PSCs generation 2, those operating offshore have 
contributed the most with a mean of US$534,356,000 (see table 2, Appendix 2). 
 
Table 5 reveals that large Contractors have contributed the most total revenue for the 
government.  Large companies have supplied more than 50% of their total revenues, while 
medium and small companies have contributed less than 50%. Given that a high proportion of 
government revenue comes from large companies, it is quite understandable if large companies 
have a strong bargaining position in influencing government policy of the industry. 
 
 
Table 5  Government Share by Size of the Operator 
 
Size of the Operator Government 
Share (%)  
Rank Government Share 
(in US$ 000) 
Rank 
Small 0.182 3               1,211 3 
Medium 0.441 2           136,524 2 
Large 0.541 1           522,097 1 
 
 
Contractor Profit  
 
Table 6 presents means for total contractor profits based on the ‘generations’ of the PSCs, 
the regions, the working areas, the size and the ownership of the FOCs over  the last 30 years.  
 
 
Table 6 Means for Contractor Profit 
 
Category US $ 000 Rank 
Generation     
1      58,267 3 
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Table 6 Means for Contractor Profit (continued) 
 
2      99,012  1 
3      63,861  2 
   
Regions     
Central Sumatera (Riau) 123,462 2 
Eastern Java 6,782 7 
Eastern Kalimantan 82,383 3 
Irian Jaya 15,391 6 
Jambi 2,181 8 
Maluku 239 10 
Northern Sumatera (Aceh) 172,866 1 
Southern Sulawesi  1,239 9 
Southern Sumatera 19,590 5 
Western Java 81,153 4 
   
Working areas   
Onshore areas 82,241 1 
Offshore areas 59,023 2 
   
Size of the Operator   
Small 387 3 
Medium 27,067 2 
Large 111,623 1 
   
Ownership   
US 130,913 1 
UK 55,712 3 
France 85,470 2 
Canada 6,137 5 
Others 20,691 4 
   
 
 
From the table it can be seen that there was an increase in Contractors’ profits from a 
mean US$ 58,267,000 in PSCs generation 1 to US$ 99,012,000 in generation 2, which represents 
an increase of 41.15%. However, in PSCs generation 3 contractor profits decreased 35.5% to only 
US$ 63,861,000.  
 
Operational Indicators 
 
Table 7 illustrates how the operational activities of the petroleum industry have 
developed over the last 30 year. In particular, the table details indicators such as the length of the 
seismic achievement, total exploratory wells, total oil reserves, total crude oil production and the 
total unit of contract signed between the host government and the FOCs. 
 
A Longitudinal Analysis of the Indonesian Production… (Parulian Sihotang) 105
Table 7 ANOVA FOR PSCs Operational Indicators (1967-1999) 
 
Selected 
Indicators 
One-Way ANOVA Kruskal Wallis Test of 
Significance at 5% 
level 
Multiple range test 
(Scheffe method)  
at 5% level 
 Period Means Period Means   
 Gen.1 Gen.2 Gen.3 Gen.1 Gen.2 Gen.3 ANOVA KW  
Seismic 38,979 45,528 136,494 42,058 42,459 75,565 0.01 0.00 Gen 3 > Gen 1; 
Gen 3 > Gen 2 
Exploratory 
Wells 
119.70 183.55 127.42 142 185 124.50 0.01 0.03 Gen2> 
Gen3>Gen1 
Reserve 3,186 7,038 10,091 3,156 7,850 10,066 0.00 0.00 Gen2> 
Gen3>Gen1 
Crude oil 
production 
971 1,491 1,531 890 1,415 1,568 0.00 0.00 Gen 3> Gen1; 
Gen 2> Gen1 
Unit of 
contract 
6.22 9.27 13.33 5.00 9.00 14.50 0.00 0.01 Gen 3>Gen1; 
Gen3>Gen2 
 
 
Discussion of Results and Linkage to Concept of Accountability 
 
I. Contractor Share Increases at the Expense of Government Share?  
 
As discussed previously, in the PSCs generation 1 (1967-1976) the average government 
share was 44.86%, while for generation 2 (1978-1987), it was 57.49% and for generation 3 (1988-
1999), it was 42.40%. Quite surprisingly in  22 of 33 years, the host government proportion of the 
petroleum revenue was less than 50%. By contrast, for the majority of this period the contractor 
share, consisting of profit and cost recoveries was, more than 50%. The highest government share 
was 68% in 1981, while the lowest share was only 36.5% in 1998.   
 
As has been previously discussed, the government share since 1981 has declined while 
the contractor share has increased. For a while, changes in the terms and conditions of the PSCs in 
the second generation has increased the government share. Unfortunately, the increase did not last 
long enough. The trend line of government share in the figure indicates that from 1981 onwards, 
despite high international oil prices, the government share has decreased. The high international oil 
price since 1974 seems to have actually brought more benefits to the FOCs than to the host 
government. A series of exploration incentive packages introduced by the government at the 
beginning of the 1990s to attract more investment in the petroleum sector appears to have been 
unsuccessful in increasing the government share. Indeed, the incentive packages have increased 
the contractor share. However, an increase in contractor share seems to have been at the expense 
of a decrease in government share.  
 
The introduction of a new scheme for calculating cost recoveries in 1977 to replace the 
40% cap in cost recoveries and the apparent weakness of government control on the 
implementation, seem to have caused a loss of government portion (Sihotang, 2003). One 
argument is that this new cost recovery scheme has presented a number of loopholes that can be 
exploited by Contractors to inflate their cost (recoveries) which eventually causes huge 
inefficiency to the industry. Furthermore, the changes in the content of the PSCs do not seem to 
have added value to the petroleum industry since the current structure of managing the petroleum 
industry-with the NOC (now BP) as manager and FOCs only as contractor to NOC (now BP) - 
does not have enough capability and competence for effective control. In this respect, one could 
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argue that, in order for the changes in the content of the PSCs between the host country and FOCs 
to add value to the industry, the current accountability relationship between them needs to be 
properly re-structured  (see also Laughlin, 1990 and 1996). PSCs as tool for implementing 
contractual accountability relationship between host country as principal and FOCs as agents has 
to provide structure that can balance the principal’ unquestioned right to control the behaviour of 
the agent’ (Laughlin, 1996) and the agent’s freedom to pursue whatever actions that seem 
appropriate (Stewart, 1984).  
 
 The changes in terms and conditions of PSCs over their three generations seem to be 
unable to eliminate the unbalance revenue share between the host country and FOCs. This could 
be as a result of the PSC emphasis on probity accountability base of Stewart (1984), which focuses 
too much on legal meaning of the contract. PSCs’ changes in terms and conditions over the last 30 
appear to lack capability to provide industry mechanism and practices to achieve performance and 
policy accountability bases in Indonesian petroleum industry (Stewart, 1984) (More about 
accountability issues could be found in Stewart (1984) and Laughlin (1996)). As a result, the 
whole accountability relationship between the host country and FOCs seem to have failed in 
adding value in the Indonesian petroleum industry for equal benefits of both host county and 
FOCs.  In addition, the notion of low trust in the accountability relationship in Indonesian 
petroleum industry may lead the host country to exert greater control over the behaviour of the 
agent through more formal and sophisticated systems and procedures (Fox, 1974; Laughlin, 1996).  
 
  In comparison to a previous study by Bindenman (1999) on PSCs economic performance 
over the period 1966 to 1998, the government share contributed from the Indonesian PSCs is 
actually below both regional and worldwide averages. For example, in Asia, the average 
government share ranges from a minimum of 55.85% to a maximum of 71.79% (In her study, she 
reported the contractor share rather than the government share. Indeed, the government share is 
100% minus the contractor share. She also reported contractor share in other regions such as in 
Central America  (36.57% to 64.71%), Eastern Europe (37% to 51.93%), Middle East (15.75% to 
27.80%), in North Africa (18% to 38.67%) and South Central Africa (29.17% to 55.69%)). While 
Indonesian PSCs range from a minimum of 36.5% to a maximum of 68%. Bindeman (1999) 
argued that one possible explanation for a low government share is the FOCs’ operating 
inefficiency caused by a lack of effective industry infrastructure, such as a lack of reliable host 
country control mechanisms and a lack of best practice guidelines in all aspects of the industry’s 
activities.  
 
It is clear from this argument that the government’s structure and strategy for managing 
the industry needs to be urgently reformed in order to find ways to add more efficiency to the 
industry. Government management control of the industry needs to focus more on operational 
efficiency issues rather than on narrow financial compliance. In order to add more efficiency to the 
industry, not only does there have to be a strong government control in place, but also industry 
best practice guidelines and indicators need to be introduced and developed.  
 
The trendline for the contractor’s net profit and cost recoveries over the last 30 years 
indicated that the average cost recoveries were higher than that of contractor profit, especially 
since 1977 when a new cost recovery scheme was introduced. It seems there are at least three 
possible explanations for this. First, the contractor possibly expanded their exploration and 
development in such frontier areas as deepwater offshore that requires very intensive capital. 
Second, the contractor’s operations are possibly not efficient. Third, there could be a combination 
of the two. One can argue that third reason could be most plausible since the average cost recovery 
A Longitudinal Analysis of the Indonesian Production… (Parulian Sihotang) 107
and exploration cost per barrel of crude oil has been increasing over the last 30 years. This should 
not have been the case if contractors’ operations, as a result of their long learning curve, were 
efficient. Even worse, the government supervisory and control ability has been so ineffective and 
incapable of doing the proper job to manage the FOCs’ operations (Oon, 1986). According to Oon: 
 
“There may indeed be a trend towards an apparent new accommodation between 
the foreign company and host government, but this does not mean that the latter 
has necessarily secured a markedly greater share of the benefits from the 
extractive operation. Preoccupation with obtaining formal ownership and control 
over the extractive operation has not meant that real control has in fact been 
exercised” (p.220) 
 
Once again, the issues of industry best practice and strong government control are central if the 
petroleum industry is to operate efficiently for the benefit of both the host government and the 
FOCs. This issue of  oil industry best practice was also raised by Bindenman (1999) when she 
pointed out: 
 
 “The host government’s main concern in the context of uncertain exploration 
and development is that FOC applies best-practice methods during both stages in 
order to maximize total production. And they  [host government] can ensure this 
by having the capability for monitoring the operation…” (p.86).  
 
II. Role for Local Authorities and People 
 
The longitudinal analysis on the petroleum industry performance for the last 30 indicates 
that there have been only four regions that have contributed the majority of oil revenue to the host 
government. They include  Central Sumatera, West Java, Northern Sumatera and Eastern 
Kalimantan. Yet, for the last 30 years, the central government has ignored the interests and 
aspirations of these regional governments and their local people. As a result, all of these regions 
are now desperately asking for the right to get involved in managing the petroleum industry 
through a variety of mechanisms. Northern Sumatera, especially in the Aceh sub-region, has been 
the most troubled area. Trouble in this area has prevented the FOCs from operating its main gas 
fields for more than one year in 2001 that have caused million losses both for the government and 
the contractor (Financial Times, 2001).  
 
As argued by Bennet and Sellgren (1992) the vertical transfer of central government 
authority to the local authority (Also known as decentralization) in managing strategic natural 
resources such as oil and gas will open the way for local people get involved in the monitoring 
and control functions of the natural resources. In the context of developing countries, they further 
argued that failure to accommodate the interests of the local authority and its people in the 
decision-making structure could cause social unrest that will create inefficiency in the industry. 
  
Similarly, Korten (1995) argued that the local community has to be empowered to create 
localized economies. In this sense, he further argued that the system of global co-operation has to 
be transformed to empower the local since:  
 
“development depends on the people’s ability to gain control and use 
effectively the real resources of their localities...Yet most development 
interventions transfer control of local resources to even larger and more 
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centralized institutions that are unaccountable to local people and 
unresponsive to their needs “(p.5). 
 
In fact, since 1998 there have been enormous efforts by the Indonesian central 
government to proactively respond to the aspirations of the local people and authority. These 
efforts culminated in 1999 when the Parliament passed two laws, which were intended to empower 
the role of the local governments in Indonesia. These two laws consist of Law No.22/1999 
regarding the ‘Regional Government Autonomy’; and Law No.23/1999 regarding the ‘Balance 
Budget for Central Government and Regional Government’. Law No.22/1999 states that the 
regional governments have the power to manage all natural resources in the regions, except oil and 
gas. In other words, managing the petroleum industry is still under central government authority. 
There is speculation that the exclusion of the regional government from managing oil and gas 
activities management is due to the intensive lobbying by the major FOCs who see that the active 
role of the regional government in managing the petroleum industry will do more harm than good 
(The Jakarta Post, 2001). Indeed, Law No.23/1999 states that the regional government will get 
15% of the total petroleum revenue resulting from the region after the Contractor takes its share. 
However, the regional governments also claim that their voices need to be heard and their interests 
need to be accommodated in petroleum management. This phenomenon adds credibility to the 
introduction of a new structure of accountability relationship between the host governments 
(central and regional governments) and the FOCs.  
 
III. Dominant Role for Foreign Influence 
 
US, UK, and French oil companies have been the largest revenue contributors to 
government coffers over the last 30 years, with those from the US being the largest. One can argue 
that these foreign companies will also bring with them their own self-interest agenda to influence 
the way a country like Indonesia manages the industry (Ikenberrry and Kupchan, 1990). 
 
This phenomenon was also supported when looking at comments of some local experts 
during the discussion of a new oil and gas law in Indonesia when they suspected that “this new oil 
and gas law is actually for the benefit of foreign interests” (Jakarta Post, 2001). Under the new 
law, the role of petroleum management has transferred from Pertamina to the government. 
Although this is intended to increase industry efficiency by abolishing the dual conflicting role of 
the NOC, it could potentially do more harm than good for the future of the industry in Indonesia if 
the government lets itself be guided by these foreign interests (Mikesell, 1971; Mackay and 
Mackay, 1975).  Moreover, it is going to be very difficult for the government to keep free from the 
influence of foreign interests in managing the industry, given that 90% of Indonesian petroleum 
working areas are controlled by foreign operators, and that FOCs produce in excess of 95% of the 
country’s oil and gas (Pane, 2000; Machmud, 2000), Therefore, government regulation of the 
industry needs to be strengthened by introducing industry best practices in all important areas 
(Noreng, 1980). In this way, foreign interests may be neutralized (Aharoni, 1986; Oon, 1986).  
 
Given foreign companies have dominated the Indonesian petroleum industry for the last 
30 years, it may well be that any industry best practices that is introduced will be influenced 
heavily by the practices of those companies. However, evidence revealed from studies by Hove 
(1986) and Parera (1989) should be borne in mind; they claimed that the exploitative and 
colonizing tendency of developed countries might be seen in the name of harmonization and 
standardization of international standards and practices through the dominant role of multinational 
corporations. For example, accounting and reporting standards and practices implemented in 
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developed countries have been imposed on the developing countries without the consideration of 
local interests (Hove, 1996).  
 
 In this context, Briston (1984) pointed out that developing countries are really in need of 
industry best practices, especially in accounting and auditing, that enables them to control the 
multinational corporations and help them in economic planning and decision-making. For 
example, these accounting practices will not only capture the financial aspect of the foreign 
company’s operation but also the non-financial aspect such as information regarding the purchase 
of inputs locally, profit and capital repatriations, extent of planned or actual local equity 
participation, the level of employment provided, environmental protection, construction of social 
overheads such as roads and housing, and the use of locally owned transportation. It is this non-
financial aspect that PSCs have failed to capture over their three generations.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The longitudinal study on the PSCs performance over the last 30 years have indicated that 
the current structure of the agreements seemed to have failed in supporting the dynamic 
contractual accountability between the host country and the FOCs. The PSCs lacked the capability 
to promote both host country and FOCs’ interests in a fair and reasonable way. Changes in terms 
and conditions of the Indonesian PSCs without changes in accountability structure seemed to have 
led to positive changes in the up-stream sector’s operational performance; However, this increase 
in industry performance appears to have benefited FOCs at the expense of the host country due to 
the latter’s lack of capability for controlling the behaviour of the former.  
 
Indeed, changes in PSCs terms and conditions over the last 30 years have done more 
harm than good for developing an accountable and transparent government-led management of the 
Indonesian petroleum industry. Findings from the longitudinal study seem to confirm (1) the need 
for the restructuring of the current accountability relationship between the host country and FOCs 
followed by changes in terms and conditions of the current PSCs; and (2) the need for introducing 
industry best practice to facilitate the restructured accountability relationship in order to add more 
value in the industry for the equal benefit of the host country and FOCs. 
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